| Interlocking Challenges. The 21st century is | | | | had we realized and acted on our opportunity for |
| presenting the world with a surprisingly dangerous | | | | collective action that the end of the Cold War |
| and complex set of interlocking challenges:o global | | | | presented. |
| warming ;o environmental degradation;o declining | | | | Opportunity Missed. The Cold War had bottled up |
| energy resources declining in relation to demand ;o | | | | and distorted a number of trends. The end of |
| the rising insistence of the world's disadvantaged | | | | colonialism, which should have left the new states |
| for respect and a realignment of the distribution | | | | free to organize themselves, was instead replaced |
| of both political power and economic resources. | | | | by pressures to join sides in the new global |
| Any one of these changes would threaten our | | | | conflict between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The |
| world order; together they pose a challenge of | | | | move toward equality of peoples regardless of |
| unprecedented danger because they | | | | ethnic background or geographic location was |
| simultaneously attack our climate, the cleanliness | | | | subverted by the shifting of focus to this new |
| of the very air we breathe, our economy, and | | | | conflict as well. Efforts to achieve North-South |
| the international political system that we use to | | | | equality within capitalism took second place to the |
| manage our lives on our shrinking planet. How can | | | | perceived need to win the world for capitalism. |
| we find the resources to solve all these problems | | | | Democratization was seen either as a luxury that |
| at once? How can we focus our attention in so | | | | could not be afforded or an outright threat by |
| many directions at once? | | | | superpowers more concerned with lining up allies |
| Moreover, their interlocked nature presents a | | | | among the ruling elites. |
| challenge of awesome complexity. Competition for | | | | The Cold War's end removed these artificial |
| energy resources clashes with demands of poor | | | | constraints on the process of liberation. It |
| peoples for a restructuring of the global political | | | | removed the need for all to march in lockstep in |
| system. Finding economic resources to tackle | | | | a global campaign--there was no more global |
| global poverty, create a non-carbon-based energy | | | | campaign. Local political disturbances in new states |
| infrastructure, and clean up pollution simultaneously | | | | were no longer a threat to the world system |
| seems impossible but failure to address any one | | | | because there was no longer an outside power |
| threatens to exacerbate the political divide | | | | looking for opportunities to take advantage of |
| between haves and have-nots. | | | | these disturbances. So the end of the Cold War |
| The interlocking nature of these challenges is | | | | allowed a return to the process of liberating and |
| dangerous not only because "you can't solve just | | | | enfranchising people worldwide. |
| one problem" but because it raises significantly the | | | | The Cold War's end--and, in particular, the nature |
| likelihood of new, unanticipated phenomena | | | | of the Cold War's end--gave the world an historic |
| emerging rapidly and taking us by surprise. The | | | | opportunity. The war ended calmly and peacefully; |
| explosion of a global jihad and its current | | | | no one was defeated, and the two sides ended |
| metamorphosis into endless self-initiated, | | | | up shaking hands, albeit gingerly, and agreeing that |
| uncoordinated , copy-cat acts of | | | | working together would make the world a better |
| anti-establishment violence sees to be one | | | | place. Previous wars--World War II, World War I, |
| example. The sudden loss of will by a tired Soviet | | | | the Napoleonic wars, the Thirty Years' War--had |
| leadership of a visibly failing and--by its | | | | ended with stunned populations impoverished and |
| people--increasingly rejected system of | | | | desperate, economies and infrastructures |
| government is another. More such surprises can | | | | shattered. The Cold War, by comparison, ended |
| be expected. | | | | as an opportunity. |
| Foreign Policy Principles. To cope with this | | | | For a brief moment in time, it would not be too |
| multifaceted challenge will require a far more | | | | far from the truth to say that, on a global scale, |
| thoughtful public debate than has yet occurred. | | | | money and goodwill were plentiful, and security |
| Two centuries ago, as the colonies revolted | | | | was no longer an issue. The major masses of |
| against Great Britain, such a fundamental and | | | | organized populations--the U.S., West Europe, |
| thoughtful debate occurred over the question of | | | | Russia, China--were beginning a decade of |
| how best to design a new form of national | | | | economic growth with no significant security |
| government. We are still trying to figure out the | | | | threat. No fundamental ideological debate was |
| details, of course, but the US grew successfully | | | | hindering cooperation. Fukuyama had a point - if |
| on the basis of a few revolutionary principles of | | | | history did not end, at least it hesitated. We had a |
| national governance that were defined and agreed | | | | chance--and it was a clearly visible chance at the |
| upon at that time: power to the people unless | | | | time, not just in hindsight--to do things better. |
| expressly reserved for the government, states | | | | It was not lack of economic ability or lack of |
| would have certain rights the central government | | | | technical ability or security concerns that stood in |
| could not take away, the central government | | | | the way. Courage, imagination, and a willingness to |
| would have three branches to balance each other | | | | insist on principle could at the beginning of the |
| and prevent the reemergence of dictatorship. | | | | 1990's have enabled the world to start moving |
| The challenge of the 21st century may require | | | | down a fundamentally new path: a path of slow, |
| the enunciation of a similar set of principles to | | | | careful, tedious, little steps designed incrementally |
| govern how we execute foreign policy. A few | | | | to bring justice and a sense of being respected to |
| suggestions follow:o Principle #1. Violence is a poor | | | | all the world's various groups whose legitimate |
| strategy for solving complex problems.o Principle | | | | concerns had been marginalized for so long in the |
| #2. It's not "truth" but perceptions that matter.o | | | | name of winning the Cold War, or winning WWII, |
| Principle #3. Nothing is ever black and white.o | | | | or winning WWI. This, of course, would have |
| Principle #4. Taboos exist to protect the guilty. | | | | amounted to a realization of Fukuyama's vision: a |
| Agreement on a set of principles to underlie our | | | | world of slow, perhaps dull, steps toward justice |
| foreign policy would help us think about the | | | | for all without the distortions of the past |
| consequences of proposed courses of action. We | | | | ideological campaigns against communism, fascism, |
| may for short-term gain choose to violate | | | | expansionism, capitalism. We should read |
| Principle #1 and use violence to alleviate some | | | | Fukuyama as offering not a prediction (for who |
| adverse condition of a complex problem we face, | | | | after all can ever predict history?) but as an |
| but recognizing the principle we are violating will at | | | | opportunity. He told us, in effect, that we had at |
| least help us to go in with our eyes open, realizing | | | | the end of the Cold War a very unusual chance |
| full well that the long-term consequences will | | | | to shift the course of history onto a new path. |
| inevitably be a mess that we will have to clean up | | | | During the Cold War and, indeed, throughout |
| rather than deluding ourselves into thinking that | | | | known human history, the predominant model has |
| the violence we perpetrate will solve the problem. | | | | been to build a society and then to expand its |
| "Solving" the bad sound of an untuned violin with a | | | | power by forcing others to join. The opportunity |
| hammer leaves you with a smashed violin. | | | | at the end of the Cold War was to begin |
| We may choose endlessly to debate the "truth" | | | | developing societies on the principle of making |
| of an issue, and, indeed, so we should, because | | | | those societies so attractive that others would |
| such debate is the foundational requirement for | | | | want to join. Russia took a laudable step in this |
| acquiring knowledge and understanding, but | | | | direction in letting the ethnic republics go free and |
| Principle #2 will remind us that far more important | | | | then trying to entice them back. Unfortunately, |
| if you want to reach agreement is simply thinking | | | | ruling elites could not break old habits, and |
| about why the other guy sees the world | | | | movement down this road came to a screeching |
| differently. | | | | halt in a tiny place almost no one, except perhaps |
| Whenever you hear the claim that X is good and | | | | readers of the 19th century Russian writer |
| Y is evil, Principle #3 should be a red flag: those | | | | Lermontov, had ever heard of: Chechnya. |
| who depict the world in black and white are either | | | | A fundamental change had occurred in the course |
| colorblind or trying to put one over on you. "Evil" | | | | of world history by 1990: suddenly, now, for the |
| is an appellation not designed to inform but to | | | | first time, everyone knew everything. Faxes, |
| prevent discussion. Closely allied to this practice is | | | | CNN, and then the Internet meant there were |
| that of making some subject taboo. | | | | effectively no more secrets. We still have no real |
| Taboo subjects are precisely the things you | | | | idea of the impact of modern communications on |
| should discuss. Taboos are covers to protect the | | | | world developments, but the well-known impact |
| guilty from scrutiny. When society accepts a | | | | of faxes on the Tiananmen Crisis and the |
| subject as "taboo," as something one simply does | | | | abortive coup attempt by the Soviet old guard |
| not discuss, society is accepting a loss of | | | | provides clues. It must surely have become |
| freedom. If you live in a democracy and there is | | | | obvious to virtually every repressed individual |
| a significant issue of policy that cannot be | | | | across the globe by the end of the 20th century |
| discussed, be suspicious: the elite is trying to | | | | that whatever excuses had ever been used in |
| prevent you from seeing the truth. A population | | | | the past to justify ignoring, oppressing, |
| that becomes skilled at avoiding issues is a | | | | disenfranchising, and robbing them no longer held |
| population preparing itself for dictatorship. | | | | any validity whatsoever. |
| Violence Losing Value. Perhaps the most | | | | The Cold War had been used to justify ignoring a |
| important of the above principles is the first: | | | | vast array of injustices against "marginal" groups, |
| violence is a poor strategy for solving complex | | | | from truly marginal minorities to the vast majority |
| problems. This principle increasingly applies in our | | | | of the population in some countries. As chance |
| increasingly interconnected world regardless of the | | | | would have it, however, the test case for the |
| power of the side that chooses violence: its | | | | new era in world affairs turned out to be |
| power not translated into actual ability to resolve | | | | Chechnya, where a tiny population that had been |
| problems. | | | | resisting Russian expansionism for two centuries |
| A powerful country may be stymied because its | | | | took the new world political atmosphere at face |
| problems are not amenable to solution by the | | | | value and announced that, "Well, yes, thank you |
| means available to it. Alternatively, it may be | | | | very much for the offer, we will be most pleased |
| weakened by internal disagreement over goals or | | | | to become independent. After all, we have been |
| policies to achieve them. Or, it may have the | | | | saying that for two centuries. So nice of you to |
| ability but not be able to perceive it through | | | | pay attention." The Russian response did not go |
| rose-colored glasses or a penchant for | | | | over well: "Ah, well, we...ah...actually didn't have you |
| conservative thinking. Whatever the cause of a | | | | specifically in mind; you're not a "republic," you |
| great power's problems, the main consequence in | | | | see, you're part of "us" and...well...there's the oil...and |
| such a scenario is simply to turn it into a larger | | | | those other internal minorities...Dagestan, and what |
| target. | | | | all..." In the event, two Russian-Chechen wars, |
| In a world of popular participation in foreign policy, | | | | near genocide of the Chechen people, heroic |
| rapid communication, asynchronous warfare, and | | | | attempts at exposure by heroic Russian reporter |
| the rise of non-state actors, traditional power | | | | Politkovskaya (since murdered) and other |
| wielded via traditional blunt military means may, | | | | reporters [see Politkovskaya, A Dirty War; Nivat, |
| over the long term, actually harm the user more | | | | Chienne de guerre; Smith, Allah's Mountains], |
| than the opponent. Such increasingly appears to | | | | freedom fighters portrayed as terrorists, and, a |
| be becoming the new reality of global international | | | | generation later, with Chechnya shattered and |
| relations...a reality missed by those who wield such | | | | devastated, and with all sides radicalized, the sad |
| power. | | | | story continues. The world protested a bit but |
| Cowboys and Complexity. The explanation for this | | | | essentially made it clear that it had other priorities. |
| takes us into the confusing world of complexity, a | | | | Realpolitik still outbid morality. |
| place where counterintuitive group behavior | | | | The next big test for the post-Cold War ruling |
| results from multiple, interacting forces affecting | | | | elites came in an equally remote location, the |
| individuals. These forces cannot be simply added | | | | jungles of southern Mexico, where the plight of |
| or subtracted; rather, the effect of each force | | | | marginalized Mayan peasant farmers who were |
| varies as a function of the other forces. | | | | not connected to the world economy via the |
| Removing one force unpredictably alters the | | | | appetite of Americans for their melons, was |
| impact of the remaining forces.o Assassinating the | | | | ignored by the American and Mexican elites as |
| leader of a rebellion may allow the emergence of | | | | they negotiated the new NAFTA arrangement. |
| several new leaders who take the rebellion in new | | | | The people of Chiapas stood up and demanded to |
| and possibly more extreme directions, as they | | | | be heard, as they had done repeatedly over the |
| compete with each other for mastery of the | | | | previous 150 years, but this time the |
| now factionalized movement.o Handing the heady | | | | repercussions led to the 1994 Mexican peso crisis |
| concept of "democracy" to a society not ready | | | | and a $20 Billion loan guarantee by Washington: a |
| for it make lead to an explosion of irresponsible | | | | very big bill for ignoring the price of melons. |
| articles in public media (something Benjamin | | | | One could continue by citing Palestine, Kashmir, |
| Franklin complained about after the American | | | | Aceh, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Colombia, but one |
| Revolution).o Invasion may radicalize a quiescent, | | | | sees the pattern...A vast array of highly diverse |
| conservative population, transforming it into an | | | | events, all with long histories but also with some |
| effective revolutionary movement. | | | | essential similarities:o Marginal people demanding to |
| Force remains force, but the pinpoint application of | | | | be heard...and respected;o Despite the post-Cold |
| force that is seen and reacted to by a wider | | | | War opportunity, the initial reaction across the |
| audience doesn't work as it used to. The death of | | | | board was to clamp down, control, use force;o |
| a rebel now becomes a force multiplier for the | | | | But, in the new interconnected world, the local |
| rebels. It not only brings in new recruits but | | | | events had global consequences. |
| provokes sympathizers to undertake their own | | | | The marginal people were no longer alone, and |
| independent, uncoordinated, unauthorized initiatives, | | | | they knew it. And, somehow, the force used |
| i.e., new behavior emerges from the individual level | | | | against them no longer seemed as effective. |
| outside of the control of any established | | | | The 1990's were not a decade of evil because |
| organization. A wave of apparently coordinated | | | | injustice was found to exist in the world; that |
| violence results from numerous, independent | | | | injustice had always existed. The 1990's were a |
| actions. | | | | decade of evil because the world's elites had the |
| Lethal force may prove useless to resist this | | | | opportunity to address that injustice and they |
| wave because no one knows how to apply it | | | | chose instead to look the other way. |
| against such unpredictable, independent actors. In | | | | Why does this matter? Because we are now |
| such cases, standard military force-on-force | | | | paying the price. |
| calculations will not provide much insight into the | | | | History may not be predictable, but it is |
| likely winner. Instead of carrying the day, cowboy | | | | predictable that the pattern of long-term injustice |
| foreign policy may only carry the minute, then | | | | against marginalized minorities leading to |
| backfire badly. | | | | unforeseen major problems for the world has not |
| It's not that we can no longer count weapons and | | | | ended. The list of candidates for the next disaster |
| calculate likely winners but that the modern world | | | | is endless. Indeed, the poor record since the Cold |
| is being transformed in a way analogous to the | | | | War of listening to mistreated peoples and |
| transformation of our understanding of physics. | | | | responding to their pleas for justice has, with a |
| Neutonian physics has been replaced by quantum | | | | few exceptions (East Timor, perhaps Kosovo and |
| physics, in which the very act of measurement | | | | Ireland), only gotten longer. |
| affects what is being measured. | | | | Wanted: Public Debate. We need to start a |
| Similarly, in the 21st century of global public | | | | serious, honest debate about the nature of our |
| awareness, the process of taking a foreign policy | | | | foreign policy. My blog, is designed to contribute to |
| action transforms the situation. It does not | | | | help stir such a debate. Truth in advertising: the |
| matter how accurately the balance of forces was | | | | principles advocated in this article as a route to a |
| calculated; your action just changed the balance. | | | | just foreign policy or any other principles will not |
| Examples are legion, but one of the clearest is | | | | solve our problems. That is not the role of |
| putting foreign boots on the ground. When soldiers | | | | principles. Rather, principles provide guidelines and |
| from a global power intrude into the territory of a | | | | targets. Politicians have struggled every day of |
| weak society that has education and modern | | | | the last two centuries over exactly how to |
| communications technology, the power calculus is | | | | implement the principle of separation of powers, |
| transformed. People become "stimulated:" they | | | | but national acceptance of that principle as the |
| network, adapt, take on new roles. Twentieth | | | | target has, so far, done much to keep us free of |
| century realpolitik may prove to have curious and | | | | dictatorship. |
| fatal consequences in the 21st century. | | | | A debate over the principles underlying our foreign |
| The Cold War's end turned out not to be the end | | | | policy will raise critical issues that we can no longer |
| of history but the beginning of a fundamentally | | | | afford to sweep under the rug in our increasingly |
| new and complicated phase, or perhaps more | | | | interconnected world, of which the basic one may |
| realistically, a return to the normal historical | | | | be: Should our national purpose be to protect our |
| processes that had been gaining speed since at | | | | political elites, our country, our Western culture, or |
| least the French Revolution. Fukuyama's | | | | all humanity? In fact, given the pace of global |
| forecasted "end of history" might have been | | | | integration, do we even have a choice? |
| more accurate had we all been more thoughtful, | | | | |