| Iran has always played a pivotal role in world | | | | modernizer and democrat who defied the |
| politics. It was once a world-class empire, it is | | | | imperialists." Iranians also conclude that Iran would |
| strategically located at a crossroad between | | | | be a democracy today were it not for the |
| Europe, the Near East, and Asia, and it has the | | | | events of 1953. While the idea seems far-fetched, |
| world's second largest petroleum reserves. In the | | | | as Mossadeq was a near autocrat during his rule, |
| 18th and 19th Century, it was the battleground | | | | he was still democratically elected and his powers |
| between imperial rivals Russia and Britain in what | | | | were derived from the Iranian parliament. The |
| came to be known as "The Great Game". In both | | | | emotional nature of the incident led to the status |
| World Wars, Iran held a strategic position and was | | | | of Mossadeq as a martyr and a symbol of |
| pivotal to the Allies' victory. In 1951, the | | | | American treachery. Among the burgeoning |
| Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) controlled | | | | Iranian blogs, many place pictures of Mossadeq |
| Iranian petroleum production. Little of the | | | | without any text on significant dates associated |
| company's profits went to Iran and the AIOC's | | | | with the popular leader as a show of morning |
| Iranian workers were severely mistreated and | | | | over a lost opportunity. The caption of one |
| underpaid. On April 30, 1951, everything changed. | | | | blogger read, "In honor of Dr, Mossadeq, a man |
| The Iranian parliament, with the support of Prime | | | | who never betrayed his own people..." |
| Minister Mossadeq, voted to nationalize Iran's oil. | | | | The Legacy of the Coup |
| The following years would change Iran, America, | | | | "...Operation Ajax has left a haunting and terrible |
| and the world forever. | | | | legacy." - Stephen Kinzer |
| In Stephen Kinzer's book All the Shah's Men, the | | | | The Coup has had many repercussions on |
| author prefaces the book with the discourse of | | | | American-Iranian relations, reaching from |
| an Iranian woman, | | | | anti-American ideological positions to historical |
| 'Why did you Americans do that terrible thing?' | | | | occurrences, such as the Hostage Crisis. |
| she cried out. 'We always loved America. To us, | | | | The ideological products of the 1953 Coup include |
| America was the great country, the perfect | | | | anti-Americanism and an obsession with foreign |
| country, the country that helped us while other | | | | intervention in Iran. The ideologies did appear |
| countries exploited us. But after that moment, no | | | | before the Coup, but they were strongly |
| one in Iran ever trusted the United States again. I | | | | reinforced and solidified by the events of August |
| can tell you for sure that if you had not done | | | | 1953. |
| that thing, you would never have had the problem | | | | First, the anti-Americanism found in the Iranian |
| of hostages being taken in your embassy in | | | | Revolution and during the Shah's time can be |
| Tehran. All your trouble started in 1953. Why, why | | | | attributed to the actions of the CIA and the |
| did you do it?' | | | | Coup's placement of the Shah as despot of Iran. |
| This woman's statement gives us a glimpse of | | | | While it is important to acknowledge that the |
| Iranian sentiment regarding American involvement | | | | British were involved in the Coup, not only did the |
| in the 1953 Coup, codenamed Operation Ajax; an | | | | Iranians think very little of the British, but also the |
| event that to this day few Americans know | | | | United States was "seen as a betrayer and not |
| about. Are her statements accurate? Did the | | | | just an old enemy." Prior to the Coup, the United |
| United States really destroy a democracy? | | | | States was very popular in Iran. But because the |
| Examining her claim will show that her views hold | | | | Americans were responsible for the Shah's |
| some truth, and that her sentiments reflect a | | | | dictatorship and for supporting him throughout his |
| deep resentment among Iranians. This | | | | reign, the blame for the Shah's actions fell on |
| examination will summarize the Iranian-American | | | | America. The Shah thereby became a symbol of |
| interactions that culminated in Operation Ajax, | | | | America's intervention in Iranian affairs. The |
| examine the effects of the 1953 Coup, and | | | | conspiracy theories that Iranians had perpetuated |
| determine that the Coup was detrimental to | | | | turned out to have truth behind them: "...the |
| Iranian-American relations; specifically, the Coup | | | | United States did help to overthrow Mossadeq, |
| hurt American credibility, resulted in anti-American | | | | and it was culpable in the establishment of the |
| sentiment, and directly led to the Hostage Crisis | | | | despotism of Mohammad Reza Shah that |
| of 1979. | | | | succeeded him." The event led to a lot speculation |
| A Brief Look at the 1953 Coup | | | | about how Iran would have been without |
| In 1950, Iran's economy was in a state of | | | | Mossadeq's removal. It became commonplace for |
| depression. Contrarily, the flourishing Anglo-Iranian | | | | Iranians to claim that were it not for the 1953 |
| Oil Company was pumping oil from Iranian soil | | | | Coup perpetrated by the Americans, Iran would |
| with the help of Iranian workers, yet it was the | | | | be a flourishing democracy, an economic |
| United Kingdom who benefited the most. The | | | | powerhouse, and even an American ally. |
| company paid the British government more in | | | | Furthermore, the Shah's atrocious repression of |
| income taxes than it paid Iran in royalties. | | | | any opposition, as well as his corruption are |
| According to Pollack, "[The AIOC] lied and | | | | blamed largely on the United States. The Shah's |
| manipulated its books to underpay the Iranian | | | | actions were so horrific that in 1976, Amnesty |
| government to the tune of billions of | | | | International stated "no country in the world has a |
| dollars...violated the terms of the 1933 | | | | worse record in human rights than Iran." In 1977, |
| concession...paid [workers] 50 cents per day...[while | | | | Jimmy Carter came to Iran supported the Shah, |
| workers had] no vacation, no sick leave, and no | | | | proclaiming that Iran is "an island of tranquility in a |
| disability compensation." The anger and | | | | sea of turbulence." America's support of the Shah |
| resentment over the AIOC, as well as | | | | regardless of his actions was a sore point that |
| Mohammad Reza Shah's attempts to centralize | | | | Iranians did not forget. |
| authority in his hands led to the establishment of | | | | Second, the Iranian focus on imperialist |
| the National Front. | | | | intervention can be attributed to Mossadeq's |
| The National Front's confrontations with the Shah, | | | | obsession with foreign involvement in Iranian |
| and later the British government, led to the | | | | affairs. The Coup proved the presence of foreign |
| American involvement in Iran that culminated in | | | | collusion in Iran, an obsession that would blind |
| the events of August 1953. There were two | | | | politicians and Iranians from the political and |
| different presidential administrations in America | | | | economic woes of Iran. The paranoia it created |
| during the time period of the National Front, and | | | | acted as a unifying force against the meddling |
| while these administrations held the same | | | | foreigners, particularly the US and Britain. While |
| ideology, they undertook different policies | | | | Iranians had previously held such ideas, the Coup |
| towards Iran. The Truman administration's | | | | confirmed those notions. Furthermore, the events |
| black-and-white image of the Cold War led to its | | | | of 1953 taught Iranians that taking an extreme |
| support of the National Front and Mossadeq's | | | | position would be the most successful method of |
| efforts. He was worried that British demands | | | | action. Even though Mossadeq's extreme position |
| would lead to the Iranians turning to the | | | | led to his downfall, he achieved the status of a |
| Communists for help. Furthermore, Truman | | | | martyr, being even more popular after his |
| recognized that the National Front was a | | | | downfall than before. Khomeini adopted this |
| nationalist movement, a not a Communist | | | | technique during the Revolution of 1978-79. |
| movement. This mentality led to closer relations | | | | The historical products of the 1953 Coup are key |
| between Iran and the United States during this | | | | to Iranian-American relations. Much of the |
| period of the Nationalization Crisis, including | | | | anti-American and anti-Western activities carried |
| defensive pacts, monetary aid, and more | | | | out by Iranians before and after the Revolution |
| pressure American on the British government to | | | | can be attributed to what is seen as America's |
| compromise with the Iranians. | | | | act of betrayal. Specifically, the 1953 Coup is |
| In 1950, ARAMCO, an American oil | | | | responsible for the Hostage Crisis. The |
| conglomeration, agreed to a 50-50 profit split | | | | hostage-takers' capture of the American |
| between it and the Saudi government. At this | | | | Embassy in Tehran was an attempt to stop |
| point, the Iranian parliament, known was the | | | | history from repeating itself, as the 1953 Coup's |
| Majles, attempted to workout a compromise with | | | | base of operations was the American Embassy. |
| the British. The British refused. This refusal, | | | | The Iranian students who stormed the Embassy |
| coupled with ARAMCO's deal, eliminated any | | | | did not want to be subject to further actions |
| moderate solution and led to the drive for | | | | against their best interest. Massoumeh Ebtekar, |
| nationalization, resulting in the Majles's | | | | the spokesperson for the hostage takers said, "In |
| nationalization legislation, which was passed on April | | | | the back of everybody's mind hung the suspicion |
| 30, 1951. | | | | that, with the admission of the Shah to the United |
| The British were furious. Their government | | | | States, the countdown for another coup |
| plotted attacks as well as a coup attempt in Iran, | | | | d'état had begun. Such was to be our fate |
| but the Americans once again stepped in | | | | again, we were convinced, and it was to be |
| supporting the Iranian cause, as fears grew that a | | | | irreversible. We now had to reverse the |
| British invasion would lead to a similar Russian | | | | irreversible." The students who stormed the |
| invasion. Yet, regardless of America's | | | | embassy allegedly had copies of the memoirs of |
| pro-nationalist stance, Mossadeq denounced any | | | | Kermit Roosevelt's (a key operative of the Coup) |
| American intervention in Iranian affairs. | | | | called Countercoup during the time of the |
| Britain then attempted to take the nationalization | | | | hostage-taking. Furthermore, the students also |
| issue to the United Nations. Mossadeq's speech to | | | | believed that the hostages could be held as |
| the world community in defense of his actions | | | | collateral to insure that the Americans would not |
| was compelling and he won the admiration of the | | | | engage in another coup attempt. The Coup's |
| American people and the United Nations. The | | | | creation of the Hostage Crisis showed the lasting |
| United Nations declared then that the | | | | impacts of August 1953. |
| nationalization crisis was an internal issue. This was | | | | Operation Ajax initiated a shockwave that |
| one of Mossadeq's greatest victories. Yet the | | | | changed the Iranian landscape greatly. The deeply |
| British felt humiliated and were still unwilling to | | | | rooted anti-American sentiment of the past and |
| compromise. | | | | of the present is fueled by the 1953 Coup, and |
| At this point, an internal power struggle in Iran led | | | | the Hostage Crisis was a direct attempt to stop a |
| to Mossadeq's de facto control of the | | | | repeat of Operation Ajax. The installment of the |
| government, and the Shah's defeat and escape to | | | | pro-American Shah following the Coup may have |
| Rome. It was now that the British attempted a | | | | seemed to create stability in the Middle East, but |
| compromise, but Mossadeq was unwilling, making | | | | in the long run, a deep-rooted distrust of |
| him seem stubborn, particularly in the eyes of | | | | Americans was created; a distrust that is proving |
| newly elected President Eisenhower. | | | | hard to overcome. |
| One of the turning points of this conflict came | | | | Conclusion |
| with Eisenhower's inauguration as President of the | | | | "Operation Ajax taught tyrants and aspiring |
| United States. Mossadeq thought that Eisenhower | | | | tyrants there that the world's most powerful |
| would be even more sympathetic to his cause, | | | | governments were willing to tolerate limitless |
| but he was mistaken. Eisenhower also took a | | | | oppression as long as oppressive regimes were |
| black-and-white approach to the Cold War, much | | | | friendly to the West and Western oil companies. |
| like Truman, but the discrepancy can best be | | | | That helped tilt the political balance in a vast region |
| summarized by the phrase, "you're either with us, | | | | away from freedom and toward dictatorship" - |
| or against us." As far as John Foster Dulles, the | | | | Stephen Kinzer |
| Secretary of State (whose brother, Allen Dulles | | | | In All the Shah's Men, Stephen Kinzer gave a |
| was the head of the Central Intelligence Agency) | | | | review of what a handful of American historians |
| and President Eisenhower were concerned, | | | | said regarding the Coup. Mark Gasiorowksi said, |
| Mossadeq was against them. Initially, Eisenhower | | | | "U.S. complicity in [the Coup] figured prominently...in |
| was sympathetic to Mossadeq, but Secretary | | | | the anti-American character of 1978-79 revolution, |
| Dulles convinced him otherwise. The issue was | | | | and in the many anti-American incidents that |
| exacerbated by Mossadeq's threat to side with | | | | emanated from Iran after the revolution, |
| the Soviets if the British-Iranian dispute were not | | | | including...the embassy hostage crisis." Mary Ann |
| resolved. | | | | Heiss stated that the Coup showed the United |
| On August 15, 1953, the CIA, operating from the | | | | States' lack of interest in what is best for Iranians. |
| American Embassy in Tehran, underwent its first | | | | Keddie stated, "...However exaggerated and |
| operation: Operation Ajax. The undertaking sought | | | | paranoid some charges by Iranians may be, |
| to depose Mossadeq and re-install the Shah as the | | | | suspiciousness and hostility have their roots in real |
| autocratic leader of Iran's government. Through | | | | and important occurrences." |
| the dispersion of money and the gathering of | | | | Indeed, the American deposition of one of Iran's |
| crowds, the operation was successful, and | | | | most popular figures, and Time Magazine's Man of |
| Mossadeq was defeated. | | | | the Year in 1951 (beating out the likes of Winston |
| The Myth of the 1953 Coup | | | | Churchill, President Truman, and Dwight |
| "At a time when America is telling the world its | | | | Eisenhower), provides evidence of the |
| aims are to bring democracy to the whole plant, | | | | self-advancing position of the United States and |
| the Mossadeq era proves all of America's | | | | the disinclination towards policies that would |
| protestations to be a long lie." - An Iranian Blogger | | | | benefit the people of the world. |
| Many Iranians denounce America's involvement in | | | | It is important to take some lessons from the |
| the 1953 Coup, but did the event destroy a | | | | 1953 Coup. For one, foreign intervention in internal |
| democracy and is the United States to blame? | | | | affairs rarely produces positive effects; it |
| First, it is important to note that Mossadeq had a | | | | destroys the credibility of foreign governments |
| near autocracy during his rule. After the deposition | | | | and further pushes a country into isolation. A |
| of the Shah, Mossadeq was given near-autocratic | | | | regional or global hegemony must be mindful of |
| powers by the Iranian Majles. Second, the United | | | | the people's perceptions of its actions. What one |
| States had previously made efforts to help the | | | | government may declare as the only rational |
| Iranians, but Mossadeq seemed unwilling to | | | | option, others may consider a gross injustice. |
| reciprocate. Finally, it was Iranians who carried out | | | | Citations |
| the Coup with CIA support; it was not an | | | | BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy. (2005, |
| exclusively American undertaking; there was then | | | | June), 8. |
| a great deal of disaffection with Mossadeq in Iran, | | | | Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah's Men (Hoboken: John |
| particularly among Iran's political elite. In terms of | | | | Wiley and Sons, 2003), ix. |
| CIA involvement, the Americans only used | | | | Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of |
| $100,000 and British intelligence to engineer the | | | | Revolution (New Haven and London: Yale |
| Coup. | | | | University Press, 2003), 123-124. |
| Mossadeq was certainly not a perfect leader. He | | | | Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The |
| possessed many character flaws that hurt his | | | | Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: |
| cause. His antics may have been received with | | | | Random House, 2004), 52. |
| favor in Iran, but internationally, they made him a | | | | Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 53. |
| spectacle and a laughing stock. Mossadeq also | | | | Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 55. |
| became increasingly isolated and trusted no one, | | | | Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 56. |
| particularly his fellow Iranians. This led to his | | | | Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 57. |
| denouncement of those who voiced any | | | | Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 59. |
| opposition to his plan as traitors and British | | | | Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 63. |
| conspirators, thereby deepening his opposition | | | | Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 63-64. |
| base. Mossadeq was also uncompromising; he was | | | | Nasrin Alavi, We Are Iran (New York: Soft Skull |
| unwilling to broker a 50-50 deal with the British, a | | | | Press, 2005), 37. |
| deal which Truman appealed to Mossadeq to | | | | Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 68-69. |
| accept. His inflexibility particularly after this incident | | | | James L. Gelvin, The Modern Middle East: A |
| led Eisenhower and his administration to believe | | | | History (New York and Oxford: Oxford University |
| that the only solution to the Mossadeq situation | | | | Press, 2005), 279. |
| was to depose Mossadeq and place a more easily | | | | Moyara de Moraes Ruehsen, "Operation 'Ajax' |
| influenced leader in Iran. | | | | Revisited," Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 3 (1993): |
| While there is a great deal of evidence and claims | | | | 8-9. |
| that the Coup was not solely fueled by the CIA, | | | | Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 63. |
| the organization did act as a catalyst and was | | | | Keddie, Modern Iran, 130. |
| responsible for placing the Shah in power after | | | | Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 69. |
| Mossadeq's fall. Keddie states that "the coup could | | | | Alavi, We Are Iran, 35. |
| not have succeeded without significant internal | | | | Alavi, We Are Iran, 36-37. |
| disaffection or indifference, but without outside aid | | | | Mostafa T. Zahrani, "The coup that changed the |
| it would not have occurred." The CIA unified | | | | Middle East: Mossadeq v. the CIA in retrospect," |
| Mossadeq's opposition and armed them with | | | | World Policy Journal 19, no. 2 (2002): 1. |
| money and information, allowing the Coup to take | | | | Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, 215. |
| shape. As opposed to restoring power to the | | | | Keddie, Modern Iran, 131. |
| Iranian parliament after the Coup, the CIA | | | | Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 68-69. |
| supported a more malleable figure: the Shah, thus | | | | Gelvin, The Modern Middle East, 281. |
| guaranteeing that Iran would become an | | | | Gelvin, The Modern Middle East, 282. |
| authoritarian state. This later came to be seen as | | | | Alavi, We Are Iran, 40. |
| evidence that America did not want democracy | | | | Alavi, We Are Iran, 36. |
| for the Middle East, but rather wanted to control | | | | Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 70. |
| the region. | | | | Zahrani, "The coup that changed the Middle East," |
| Regardless of the truths and myths of the Coup, | | | | 4. |
| the sentiments of the Iranian people determined | | | | Gelvin, The Modern Middle East, 280. |
| the event's impact on Iranian-American relations. | | | | Zahrani, "The coup that changed the Middle East," |
| Neither the realities nor the actualities of the | | | | 4. |
| events of August 1953 matter when dealing with | | | | "How to Change a Regime in 30 Days," The |
| such an emotional issue. While many argue that it | | | | Economist, August 14, 2003, 1. |
| was not solely the actions of the CIA that led to | | | | Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, 204. |
| Mossadeq's toppling, the myth and political folklore | | | | Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, 213. |
| created from the event tell a different tale. Many | | | | Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, 214. |
| Iranians regard Mossadeq as "an uncorrupted | | | | Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, 214. |