The Legacy of Operation Ajax

Iran has always played a pivotal role in worldmodernizer and democrat who defied the
politics. It was once a world-class empire, it isimperialists." Iranians also conclude that Iran would
strategically located at a crossroad betweenbe a democracy today were it not for the
Europe, the Near East, and Asia, and it has theevents of 1953. While the idea seems far-fetched,
world's second largest petroleum reserves. In theas Mossadeq was a near autocrat during his rule,
18th and 19th Century, it was the battlegroundhe was still democratically elected and his powers
between imperial rivals Russia and Britain in whatwere derived from the Iranian parliament. The
came to be known as "The Great Game". In bothemotional nature of the incident led to the status
World Wars, Iran held a strategic position and wasof Mossadeq as a martyr and a symbol of
pivotal to the Allies' victory. In 1951, theAmerican treachery. Among the burgeoning
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) controlledIranian blogs, many place pictures of Mossadeq
Iranian petroleum production. Little of thewithout any text on significant dates associated
company's profits went to Iran and the AIOC'swith the popular leader as a show of morning
Iranian workers were severely mistreated andover a lost opportunity. The caption of one
underpaid. On April 30, 1951, everything changed.blogger read, "In honor of Dr, Mossadeq, a man
The Iranian parliament, with the support of Primewho never betrayed his own people..."
Minister Mossadeq, voted to nationalize Iran's oil.The Legacy of the Coup
The following years would change Iran, America,"...Operation Ajax has left a haunting and terrible
and the world forever.legacy." - Stephen Kinzer
In Stephen Kinzer's book All the Shah's Men, theThe Coup has had many repercussions on
author prefaces the book with the discourse ofAmerican-Iranian relations, reaching from
an Iranian woman,anti-American ideological positions to historical
'Why did you Americans do that terrible thing?'occurrences, such as the Hostage Crisis.
she cried out. 'We always loved America. To us,The ideological products of the 1953 Coup include
America was the great country, the perfectanti-Americanism and an obsession with foreign
country, the country that helped us while otherintervention in Iran. The ideologies did appear
countries exploited us. But after that moment, nobefore the Coup, but they were strongly
one in Iran ever trusted the United States again. Ireinforced and solidified by the events of August
can tell you for sure that if you had not done1953.
that thing, you would never have had the problemFirst, the anti-Americanism found in the Iranian
of hostages being taken in your embassy inRevolution and during the Shah's time can be
Tehran. All your trouble started in 1953. Why, whyattributed to the actions of the CIA and the
did you do it?'Coup's placement of the Shah as despot of Iran.
This woman's statement gives us a glimpse ofWhile it is important to acknowledge that the
Iranian sentiment regarding American involvementBritish were involved in the Coup, not only did the
in the 1953 Coup, codenamed Operation Ajax; anIranians think very little of the British, but also the
event that to this day few Americans knowUnited States was "seen as a betrayer and not
about. Are her statements accurate? Did thejust an old enemy." Prior to the Coup, the United
United States really destroy a democracy?States was very popular in Iran. But because the
Examining her claim will show that her views holdAmericans were responsible for the Shah's
some truth, and that her sentiments reflect adictatorship and for supporting him throughout his
deep resentment among Iranians. Thisreign, the blame for the Shah's actions fell on
examination will summarize the Iranian-AmericanAmerica. The Shah thereby became a symbol of
interactions that culminated in Operation Ajax,America's intervention in Iranian affairs. The
examine the effects of the 1953 Coup, andconspiracy theories that Iranians had perpetuated
determine that the Coup was detrimental toturned out to have truth behind them: "...the
Iranian-American relations; specifically, the CoupUnited States did help to overthrow Mossadeq,
hurt American credibility, resulted in anti-Americanand it was culpable in the establishment of the
sentiment, and directly led to the Hostage Crisisdespotism of Mohammad Reza Shah that
of 1979.succeeded him." The event led to a lot speculation
A Brief Look at the 1953 Coupabout how Iran would have been without
In 1950, Iran's economy was in a state ofMossadeq's removal. It became commonplace for
depression. Contrarily, the flourishing Anglo-IranianIranians to claim that were it not for the 1953
Oil Company was pumping oil from Iranian soilCoup perpetrated by the Americans, Iran would
with the help of Iranian workers, yet it was thebe a flourishing democracy, an economic
United Kingdom who benefited the most. Thepowerhouse, and even an American ally.
company paid the British government more inFurthermore, the Shah's atrocious repression of
income taxes than it paid Iran in royalties.any opposition, as well as his corruption are
According to Pollack, "[The AIOC] lied andblamed largely on the United States. The Shah's
manipulated its books to underpay the Iranianactions were so horrific that in 1976, Amnesty
government to the tune of billions ofInternational stated "no country in the world has a
dollars...violated the terms of the 1933worse record in human rights than Iran." In 1977,
concession...paid [workers] 50 cents per day...[whileJimmy Carter came to Iran supported the Shah,
workers had] no vacation, no sick leave, and noproclaiming that Iran is "an island of tranquility in a
disability compensation." The anger andsea of turbulence." America's support of the Shah
resentment over the AIOC, as well asregardless of his actions was a sore point that
Mohammad Reza Shah's attempts to centralizeIranians did not forget.
authority in his hands led to the establishment ofSecond, the Iranian focus on imperialist
the National Front.intervention can be attributed to Mossadeq's
The National Front's confrontations with the Shah,obsession with foreign involvement in Iranian
and later the British government, led to theaffairs. The Coup proved the presence of foreign
American involvement in Iran that culminated incollusion in Iran, an obsession that would blind
the events of August 1953. There were twopoliticians and Iranians from the political and
different presidential administrations in Americaeconomic woes of Iran. The paranoia it created
during the time period of the National Front, andacted as a unifying force against the meddling
while these administrations held the sameforeigners, particularly the US and Britain. While
ideology, they undertook different policiesIranians had previously held such ideas, the Coup
towards Iran. The Truman administration'sconfirmed those notions. Furthermore, the events
black-and-white image of the Cold War led to itsof 1953 taught Iranians that taking an extreme
support of the National Front and Mossadeq'sposition would be the most successful method of
efforts. He was worried that British demandsaction. Even though Mossadeq's extreme position
would lead to the Iranians turning to theled to his downfall, he achieved the status of a
Communists for help. Furthermore, Trumanmartyr, being even more popular after his
recognized that the National Front was adownfall than before. Khomeini adopted this
nationalist movement, a not a Communisttechnique during the Revolution of 1978-79.
movement. This mentality led to closer relationsThe historical products of the 1953 Coup are key
between Iran and the United States during thisto Iranian-American relations. Much of the
period of the Nationalization Crisis, includinganti-American and anti-Western activities carried
defensive pacts, monetary aid, and moreout by Iranians before and after the Revolution
pressure American on the British government tocan be attributed to what is seen as America's
compromise with the Iranians.act of betrayal. Specifically, the 1953 Coup is
In 1950, ARAMCO, an American oilresponsible for the Hostage Crisis. The
conglomeration, agreed to a 50-50 profit splithostage-takers' capture of the American
between it and the Saudi government. At thisEmbassy in Tehran was an attempt to stop
point, the Iranian parliament, known was thehistory from repeating itself, as the 1953 Coup's
Majles, attempted to workout a compromise withbase of operations was the American Embassy.
the British. The British refused. This refusal,The Iranian students who stormed the Embassy
coupled with ARAMCO's deal, eliminated anydid not want to be subject to further actions
moderate solution and led to the drive foragainst their best interest. Massoumeh Ebtekar,
nationalization, resulting in the Majles'sthe spokesperson for the hostage takers said, "In
nationalization legislation, which was passed on Aprilthe back of everybody's mind hung the suspicion
30, 1951.that, with the admission of the Shah to the United
The British were furious. Their governmentStates, the countdown for another coup
plotted attacks as well as a coup attempt in Iran,d'état had begun. Such was to be our fate
but the Americans once again stepped inagain, we were convinced, and it was to be
supporting the Iranian cause, as fears grew that airreversible. We now had to reverse the
British invasion would lead to a similar Russianirreversible." The students who stormed the
invasion. Yet, regardless of America'sembassy allegedly had copies of the memoirs of
pro-nationalist stance, Mossadeq denounced anyKermit Roosevelt's (a key operative of the Coup)
American intervention in Iranian affairs.called Countercoup during the time of the
Britain then attempted to take the nationalizationhostage-taking. Furthermore, the students also
issue to the United Nations. Mossadeq's speech tobelieved that the hostages could be held as
the world community in defense of his actionscollateral to insure that the Americans would not
was compelling and he won the admiration of theengage in another coup attempt. The Coup's
American people and the United Nations. Thecreation of the Hostage Crisis showed the lasting
United Nations declared then that theimpacts of August 1953.
nationalization crisis was an internal issue. This wasOperation Ajax initiated a shockwave that
one of Mossadeq's greatest victories. Yet thechanged the Iranian landscape greatly. The deeply
British felt humiliated and were still unwilling torooted anti-American sentiment of the past and
compromise.of the present is fueled by the 1953 Coup, and
At this point, an internal power struggle in Iran ledthe Hostage Crisis was a direct attempt to stop a
to Mossadeq's de facto control of therepeat of Operation Ajax. The installment of the
government, and the Shah's defeat and escape topro-American Shah following the Coup may have
Rome. It was now that the British attempted aseemed to create stability in the Middle East, but
compromise, but Mossadeq was unwilling, makingin the long run, a deep-rooted distrust of
him seem stubborn, particularly in the eyes ofAmericans was created; a distrust that is proving
newly elected President Eisenhower.hard to overcome.
One of the turning points of this conflict cameConclusion
with Eisenhower's inauguration as President of the"Operation Ajax taught tyrants and aspiring
United States. Mossadeq thought that Eisenhowertyrants there that the world's most powerful
would be even more sympathetic to his cause,governments were willing to tolerate limitless
but he was mistaken. Eisenhower also took aoppression as long as oppressive regimes were
black-and-white approach to the Cold War, muchfriendly to the West and Western oil companies.
like Truman, but the discrepancy can best beThat helped tilt the political balance in a vast region
summarized by the phrase, "you're either with us,away from freedom and toward dictatorship" -
or against us." As far as John Foster Dulles, theStephen Kinzer
Secretary of State (whose brother, Allen DullesIn All the Shah's Men, Stephen Kinzer gave a
was the head of the Central Intelligence Agency)review of what a handful of American historians
and President Eisenhower were concerned,said regarding the Coup. Mark Gasiorowksi said,
Mossadeq was against them. Initially, Eisenhower"U.S. complicity in [the Coup] figured prominently...in
was sympathetic to Mossadeq, but Secretarythe anti-American character of 1978-79 revolution,
Dulles convinced him otherwise. The issue wasand in the many anti-American incidents that
exacerbated by Mossadeq's threat to side withemanated from Iran after the revolution,
the Soviets if the British-Iranian dispute were notincluding...the embassy hostage crisis." Mary Ann
resolved.Heiss stated that the Coup showed the United
On August 15, 1953, the CIA, operating from theStates' lack of interest in what is best for Iranians.
American Embassy in Tehran, underwent its firstKeddie stated, "...However exaggerated and
operation: Operation Ajax. The undertaking soughtparanoid some charges by Iranians may be,
to depose Mossadeq and re-install the Shah as thesuspiciousness and hostility have their roots in real
autocratic leader of Iran's government. Throughand important occurrences."
the dispersion of money and the gathering ofIndeed, the American deposition of one of Iran's
crowds, the operation was successful, andmost popular figures, and Time Magazine's Man of
Mossadeq was defeated.the Year in 1951 (beating out the likes of Winston
The Myth of the 1953 CoupChurchill, President Truman, and Dwight
"At a time when America is telling the world itsEisenhower), provides evidence of the
aims are to bring democracy to the whole plant,self-advancing position of the United States and
the Mossadeq era proves all of America'sthe disinclination towards policies that would
protestations to be a long lie." - An Iranian Bloggerbenefit the people of the world.
Many Iranians denounce America's involvement inIt is important to take some lessons from the
the 1953 Coup, but did the event destroy a1953 Coup. For one, foreign intervention in internal
democracy and is the United States to blame?affairs rarely produces positive effects; it
First, it is important to note that Mossadeq had adestroys the credibility of foreign governments
near autocracy during his rule. After the depositionand further pushes a country into isolation. A
of the Shah, Mossadeq was given near-autocraticregional or global hegemony must be mindful of
powers by the Iranian Majles. Second, the Unitedthe people's perceptions of its actions. What one
States had previously made efforts to help thegovernment may declare as the only rational
Iranians, but Mossadeq seemed unwilling tooption, others may consider a gross injustice.
reciprocate. Finally, it was Iranians who carried outCitations
the Coup with CIA support; it was not anBP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy. (2005,
exclusively American undertaking; there was thenJune), 8.
a great deal of disaffection with Mossadeq in Iran,Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah's Men (Hoboken: John
particularly among Iran's political elite. In terms ofWiley and Sons, 2003), ix.
CIA involvement, the Americans only usedNikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of
$100,000 and British intelligence to engineer theRevolution (New Haven and London: Yale
Coup.University Press, 2003), 123-124.
Mossadeq was certainly not a perfect leader. HeKenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The
possessed many character flaws that hurt hisConflict Between Iran and America (New York:
cause. His antics may have been received withRandom House, 2004), 52.
favor in Iran, but internationally, they made him aPollack, The Persian Puzzle, 53.
spectacle and a laughing stock. Mossadeq alsoPollack, The Persian Puzzle, 55.
became increasingly isolated and trusted no one,Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 56.
particularly his fellow Iranians. This led to hisPollack, The Persian Puzzle, 57.
denouncement of those who voiced anyPollack, The Persian Puzzle, 59.
opposition to his plan as traitors and BritishPollack, The Persian Puzzle, 63.
conspirators, thereby deepening his oppositionPollack, The Persian Puzzle, 63-64.
base. Mossadeq was also uncompromising; he wasNasrin Alavi, We Are Iran (New York: Soft Skull
unwilling to broker a 50-50 deal with the British, aPress, 2005), 37.
deal which Truman appealed to Mossadeq toPollack, The Persian Puzzle, 68-69.
accept. His inflexibility particularly after this incidentJames L. Gelvin, The Modern Middle East: A
led Eisenhower and his administration to believeHistory (New York and Oxford: Oxford University
that the only solution to the Mossadeq situationPress, 2005), 279.
was to depose Mossadeq and place a more easilyMoyara de Moraes Ruehsen, "Operation 'Ajax'
influenced leader in Iran.Revisited," Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 3 (1993):
While there is a great deal of evidence and claims8-9.
that the Coup was not solely fueled by the CIA,Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 63.
the organization did act as a catalyst and wasKeddie, Modern Iran, 130.
responsible for placing the Shah in power afterPollack, The Persian Puzzle, 69.
Mossadeq's fall. Keddie states that "the coup couldAlavi, We Are Iran, 35.
not have succeeded without significant internalAlavi, We Are Iran, 36-37.
disaffection or indifference, but without outside aidMostafa T. Zahrani, "The coup that changed the
it would not have occurred." The CIA unifiedMiddle East: Mossadeq v. the CIA in retrospect,"
Mossadeq's opposition and armed them withWorld Policy Journal 19, no. 2 (2002): 1.
money and information, allowing the Coup to takeKinzer, All the Shah's Men, 215.
shape. As opposed to restoring power to theKeddie, Modern Iran, 131.
Iranian parliament after the Coup, the CIAPollack, The Persian Puzzle, 68-69.
supported a more malleable figure: the Shah, thusGelvin, The Modern Middle East, 281.
guaranteeing that Iran would become anGelvin, The Modern Middle East, 282.
authoritarian state. This later came to be seen asAlavi, We Are Iran, 40.
evidence that America did not want democracyAlavi, We Are Iran, 36.
for the Middle East, but rather wanted to controlPollack, The Persian Puzzle, 70.
the region.Zahrani, "The coup that changed the Middle East,"
Regardless of the truths and myths of the Coup,4.
the sentiments of the Iranian people determinedGelvin, The Modern Middle East, 280.
the event's impact on Iranian-American relations.Zahrani, "The coup that changed the Middle East,"
Neither the realities nor the actualities of the4.
events of August 1953 matter when dealing with"How to Change a Regime in 30 Days," The
such an emotional issue. While many argue that itEconomist, August 14, 2003, 1.
was not solely the actions of the CIA that led toKinzer, All the Shah's Men, 204.
Mossadeq's toppling, the myth and political folkloreKinzer, All the Shah's Men, 213.
created from the event tell a different tale. ManyKinzer, All the Shah's Men, 214.
Iranians regard Mossadeq as "an uncorruptedKinzer, All the Shah's Men, 214.