| Intro | | | | into the public spotlight." In other words, questions |
| To ask the question of whether Turkey should or | | | | of the role of religion in politics, previously |
| should not join the European Union is to | | | | perceived to have been historically resolved, have |
| completely misunderstand the context in which | | | | reappeared. However, as Hurd approximates |
| current negotiations are taking place. In other | | | | Keyman when she says that the reasons why |
| words, when France adamantly and vociferously | | | | such questions have been awoken from a |
| maintains that if and when Turkey will be "ready" | | | | prolonged period of subdued dormancy, have |
| to join the EU, it will leave it up to its electorate | | | | everything to do with the fact that approaches to |
| to decide by means of a referendum, it | | | | religion and to religious minorities, are not "set in |
| completely misses the point. The primary | | | | stone but must be constantly renegotiated." |
| objective of this paper is to briefly outline the | | | | Hurd outlines the paradigms in which both |
| contextual backdrop onto which accession talks | | | | European secularists and European exclusivists |
| have been, and continue to be made, by critically | | | | (read: Judeo-Christian secularists) operate. The |
| engaging with a cross-section of the current | | | | ethnocentric biases are beyond obvious. For |
| academic literature on this subject. Furthermore, | | | | Judeo-Christians, "secularist separation of religion |
| the last section will offer a more pragmatic | | | | from politics," is a unique "Western achievement |
| analysis of the possible directions in which | | | | that is superior to its non-Western rivals." |
| Turkey-EU negotiations could be potentially taken. | | | | Furthermore, the inability of "others," non |
| This will hopefully provide a coherent response to | | | | Judeo-Christians to transcend these fixed |
| the reality that Turkey's political, cultural and | | | | definitional presuppositions, disables Islamic |
| economical future, will not by any means, be less | | | | societies to fully realize true secularism. Inclusive |
| successful or promising, without full EU | | | | European laicists or secularists are equally biased |
| membership. | | | | and ethnocentric. This line of argument maintains |
| Background | | | | that Turkey only differs "from Europe solely in |
| There is nothing "organic" about the way in which | | | | terms of acquired characteristics." Turkish |
| the modern Turkish republic came into existence. | | | | accession to the EU will only be made possible |
| While it may be true that European modernity | | | | when these "shortcomings," will be "overcome |
| was the product of a centuries long | | | | through the importation of Western-style |
| industrialization process, a process influenced and | | | | democracy and the secularization of politics and |
| fueled by revolutionary advancements in | | | | society." |
| technological competence, the Turkish case is | | | | When the introduction mentioned that France |
| distinctly different. With the Ottoman Empire | | | | would completely miss the point, if it would leave |
| having suffered continued defeat "at the hands of | | | | the question of whether Turkey should or should |
| the major European powers," modernity came to | | | | not join the EU, to its electorate, it was not by |
| be seen as the best possible defensive strategy, | | | | any means an attack on democratic principle of |
| offering renewed military competence and in | | | | majoritarian politics. It was actually a criticism of |
| short, provide the solution to a | | | | the lack-of democratic sensitivities in France, to |
| lack-of-competitiveness problem. Initially, | | | | those cultural and religious minorities within their |
| modernity was not a ubiquitous and omnipresent | | | | own borders. The shift currently taking place in |
| fact of life, but limited to the military. | | | | Turkey, while framed as an erosion of secularism |
| It is not difficult to conceptualize why the | | | | by some, is actually becoming more sensitive to |
| Ottoman Empire opted for modernity as a way | | | | actual electoral and political realities. This is not to |
| of staying competitive among the other European | | | | say that Turkey is a textbook example of how a |
| powers and empires, of the 18th and 19th | | | | perfect democracy should be. To make such an |
| centuries. A modern army, however, also requires | | | | argument would be a mistake. However, and as |
| modern institutions to "train military officers and | | | | Hurd herself leaves open to interpretation, |
| to offer medical services to military men." Schools | | | | secularism is a social construct that can be broken |
| were added for the purpose of training these | | | | down, contested and reconstructed. Perhaps |
| officers. In addition, "capable administrators who | | | | Hurd's most crucial contribution comes at the end |
| could, among other functions, develop reliable | | | | of her article, when she makes it explicit that, |
| systems for drafting soldiers and collecting taxes," | | | | notwithstanding her main argument that Europe |
| soon followed, for the following reason. The | | | | would have to revisit its own understanding of |
| Ottoman war-machine required a systematic | | | | secularism (before Turkish integration into the EU |
| approach to the administration of public and | | | | will be successful), |
| natural resources, as well as the human capital | | | | If Europe cannot be articulated in terms of |
| required to make it all possible. One caveat | | | | complex space and complex time that allow for |
| however, does exist. While new and modern | | | | multiple ways of life (and not merely multiple |
| institutions that dealt with realizing the primary | | | | identities) to flourish, it may be fated to be no |
| objective of increasing the overall effectiveness | | | | more than the common market of an imperial |
| of the military were being erected, traditional | | | | civilization, always anxious about (Muslim) exiles |
| institutions, such as the medreses (schools | | | | within its gates and (Muslim) barbarians beyond. |
| charged with transmitting Islamic theology and | | | | John Redmond makes it explicit that if Turkey is |
| religious law) were still in operation and often | | | | to join, it must do so as a full member. Anything |
| stood in contradiction with their modern | | | | less than full membership is worrisome for the |
| counterparts. | | | | following reasons. First, Turkey would not have |
| It is at this point in the history of the Ottoman | | | | access to the EU single market, thereby making |
| Empire, that a distinction can be made between a | | | | the economic benefits of integration political (and |
| modern interpretation and a more traditional | | | | for security purposes) only. Second, there would |
| understanding of state governance. Modernity in | | | | be a lack of structural funds flowing from the |
| pre-republican Turkey benefited a select few and | | | | European Union to Turkey. Third, the most |
| alienated many, unemployment being the major | | | | important reason of all, Turkey would have "no |
| pathology of modernity in 19th century. Because | | | | seat at the EU decision-making table." It is |
| of this exclusionary effect, the modern Ottoman | | | | important to ask the question of why Turkey |
| Empire came to antagonize those individuals who | | | | would even be considered as a second-class |
| entertained more traditional approaches. Those | | | | member. The main argument for this however is |
| who had been brought up and schooled under | | | | unfortunately one designed with populist politics in |
| modern institutions "became aware of the | | | | mind and not something premised on a more |
| backwardness" of their society. With the end of | | | | cogent line of reasoning. |
| the First World War and the defeat of the | | | | To quote Redmond, Turkey is still "seen as an |
| Ottoman Empire, modernization reforms became | | | | outsider to the European mainstream, condemned |
| possible. Justified by the inefficacy of the old | | | | to irresolvable difference from its western |
| regime, the Republic People's Party (RPP), led by | | | | neighbours on historical, religious and cultural |
| Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, institutionalized modernity | | | | grounds." The general European public finds |
| in 1923, by establishing the Turkish republic. | | | | Turkey to be "too big, too poor, too far away |
| Secular Kemalism has been a predominant feature | | | | and too Islamic." In other words, Turkey does not |
| of Turkish politics, a point of constant contention | | | | fit into the social construct that goes by the |
| that often found Turkey under great political | | | | name of "Europeanness." Redmond himself points |
| turmoil, instability and uncertainty. Between 1923 | | | | out that this is but "a ludicrous concept," a |
| and 1946, Turkey operated under a single party | | | | distraction from factual reality that speaks of the |
| system. The RPP was "the original tutelary single | | | | purpose of EU integration as still being |
| party that was associated with the founding of | | | | "predominantly economic." However, Turkish |
| the republic and the westernizing reforms of | | | | economics and the success of organizations such |
| Ataturk." RPP reforms were particularly intrusive, | | | | as MUSIAD (Independent Industrialists' and |
| repressive and designed by the Kemalist state | | | | Businessmen's Association) have proved that |
| elites to "keep society under control and realize | | | | Islam is compatible with market-based economies |
| change through state action." As already | | | | and the democratic tendencies that follow as |
| mentioned, these state elites, having been brought | | | | by-products of such markets. |
| up and trained under modern institutions and | | | | Economics |
| schools, felt justified in being the ones to guide a | | | | Mousseau presents his argument in a rather |
| backward society. The only way this was possible | | | | straightforward way. Corruption and little respect |
| in their view, was to adopt a doctrine of "security | | | | for law are both cushioned between "collective, |
| maximization," using as many top-down | | | | traditional and social associations for income" and |
| authoritarian measures as deemed necessary. | | | | "state-led, feudal or command economies." |
| Turkey held elections in 1946 and in 1950, "power | | | | Contracts bind individuals and create "cooperation, |
| changed hands peacefully." Celal Bayar, a private | | | | compromise and tolerance of different interests." |
| banker, became Turkey's president. This is often | | | | Individuals have an interest in maintaining the rule |
| referred to as the inflection point in Turkish | | | | of law so as to protect these agreements or |
| politics, as with the end of one-party rule "came a | | | | contracts between them. When disagreements |
| distinction between the state elites of military | | | | surface, the state intervenes and acts as a |
| leaders and bureaucrats and the political elites | | | | dispute resolution mechanism. Limiting the role of |
| represented by elected officers." As it was the | | | | the state in this sense would therefore require a |
| case in the past, the tension between those state | | | | thin understanding of a liberal democracy. |
| elites who subscribed to secularism and nationalism | | | | However, a duality exists between maintaining |
| as a way of reinforcing Turkey's interest to | | | | state neutrality both in politics and economic |
| remain internationally competitive, and the political | | | | endeavors on one hand, and the establishing of |
| elites who were more sensitive to electoral | | | | electorally sensitive political parties. The rise of the |
| impulses, reemerged from a period of dormancy. | | | | Turkish private sector during the 1980s and |
| However, more important was Turkey's shift | | | | 1990s, has replaced "Turkey's clientalist politics |
| from the previous paradigm of "security | | | | with the market and rule of law." If one is to |
| maximization," to one of "prosperity maximization." | | | | entertain Mousseau's argument, that market |
| Democracy, for the newly elected political elites in | | | | economies and the opportunities attached to |
| power, was seen as the only legitimate way of | | | | them, will eventually and naturally lead Turkey to |
| catering to the "wishes of the people." | | | | adopt Western-style civil-rights and democracy, |
| However, the prospect of democratic | | | | then the reality that culturally and traditionally |
| consolidation was cut short in 1960 when the | | | | loaded Islamic capitalism can succeed and has |
| military intervened by means of a coup d'etat. In | | | | succeeded, fails to be recognized as an alternative |
| 1980, the military intervened once again, this time | | | | mean to a similar end. |
| imposing the dissolution of all political parties. To fill | | | | Analysis |
| in the newly created void, the military tried to | | | | Part I |
| impose a two-party system that although was | | | | There are a few scenarios that could unfold. The |
| favoured by military commanders, failed to | | | | first is that Turkey will not end up joining the |
| materialize. The 1971 forced change in | | | | European Union. However, this would offer more |
| government by the military, acts as a further | | | | costs than benefits for a few reasons. One such |
| example of the instability of Turkish politics in the | | | | reason is that the current public antagonism |
| past. | | | | towards Turkey and Islam will only become more |
| Ilter Turan argues that there needs to be a | | | | acrimonious. The dehumanization and disconnection |
| reassessment of the extent to which politics in | | | | between the EU (read: the West) and Turkey |
| Turkey has really been a stable undertaking. While | | | | (read: the East) cannot possibly have any positive |
| the current Turkish President, Ahmet Necdet | | | | consequences. Turkey is not Europe's or the |
| Sezer is himself a state elite and staunch | | | | West's enemy. Islam is not incompatible with |
| advocate of "strict secularism and absolute | | | | democracy and it certainly isn't incompatible with |
| national sovereignty," the Turkish Prime Minister is | | | | market-based liberal economies. |
| less divorced from electoral politics. Recep Tayyip | | | | The duality that is found in the EU's acquis |
| Erdogan is Turkey's PM and while his party, the | | | | communitaire is indicative of the double standards |
| Justice and Development Party (or AKP) are | | | | of such institution. While the EU's Copenhagen |
| comfortable in power, with a majority of seats in | | | | criteria may push turkey towards maintaining the |
| parliament under their control, it is doubtful | | | | current secularist status-quo, this is simply |
| whether the up and coming presidential elections, | | | | unacceptable if Turkey is also to develop an |
| in May of 2007, will see Erdogan succeed Sezer. | | | | electorally sensitive democracy. Religion, and more |
| Turkey-EU Relations Background | | | | importantly, Islam, has and will continue to |
| Turkey signed an Association Agreement with the | | | | dominate both private and increasingly as of late, |
| EU in 1963. In 1987 Turkey applied for EU | | | | public life. As it has been pointed out before, |
| membership but was rejected in 1987 due to a | | | | secularism is a construct that is constantly being |
| lack of economic development, a political and civil | | | | reinterpreted to keep in-sync with the dynamic |
| rights deficit, and a chronic unemployment rate | | | | complexities of change. In other words, the |
| that was considered to destabilize EU markets. In | | | | ethnocentric features of EU's integration process |
| 1995, a Customs Agreement was negotiated and | | | | is borderline imperialistic, failing to address local and |
| signed, followed by the EU Commission's decision | | | | regional uniqueness and even more worryingly, as |
| in 1997, at the Luxembourg summit, to not grant | | | | is the case in Turkey, inadvertently preventing |
| candidate status to Turkey. However, new | | | | democracy fundamentals from taking root. It is |
| membership talks started once again in 1999. | | | | precisely because of this, that Turkey's future |
| While Turkey was invited in 1999 by the | | | | cannot be said to be less certain or more bleak |
| European Council in Helsinki to join the CEEC | | | | as a result of not having been made a full |
| (Central and Eastern European Countries) | | | | member of the European Union. |
| candidates, the European Commission refused to | | | | However, if Turkey is to join the European Union, |
| "set up a timetable for starting accession talks." | | | | this will need to be more than just a mechanical |
| Once again, the lack of political and economic | | | | and technical process. Europe, as was the point of |
| reform was cited as having been the impetus | | | | some of the authors discussed, must engage in |
| driving the decision to refrain from taking the | | | | redefining for themselves the role of religion in |
| revolutionary step of accepting Turkey into the | | | | society and the extent to which secularism is but |
| European club. | | | | a superficial and ignorant misunderstanding of the |
| While Turkey reopened negations with the EU, | | | | more bona fide realities of pragmatic politics. Sure |
| after significant political, civil and legal reforms had | | | | Turkey will have access to structural funds, the |
| been implemented, the EU had once again made | | | | promising EU single-market and a seat at the |
| its position clear: that "Turkey would have to be in | | | | decision-making table. This unfortunately does not |
| full formal compliance with the Copenhagen | | | | suffice. Market-oriented economics and the |
| criteria," as adopted at the EU summit in Denmark | | | | contracts that provides the glue that holds it all |
| in 1993, if it is to be considered. The primary | | | | together simply cannot function if the European |
| features of this Copenhagen criteria ask that | | | | courts put in charge of arbitrating contract |
| Turkey "(i) be a stable democracy, respecting | | | | disputes, cloak their bias towards EU parties in |
| human rights, the rule of law and the protection | | | | rhetoric that dehumanizes Islam by maintaining the |
| of minorities, have (ii) a functioning market | | | | "us" (read: the West, the good) versus "them" |
| economy and the capacity to cope with the | | | | (read: the East, the bad, the enemies) paradigm. |
| competitive pressures and market forces within | | | | Part II |
| the Union and (iii) adopt the common rules, | | | | Seeing Islam as a problem in need of a solution is |
| standards and policies that make up the body of | | | | also particularly problematic. The questions of |
| EU law," (also known as the acquis communitaire). | | | | whether the European Union is engaged in an |
| As it currently stands, Turkey will have to wait | | | | economic integration exercise, or in a political and |
| until 2014 (at the earliest), before being given the | | | | ideological one, is arguable. There is a sense that |
| green light to accede. | | | | Islam belongs to a crude, unjust and barbaric past, |
| Secularism Unpacked | | | | incompatible with a more modern understanding |
| It could be argued that multiculturalism is no longer | | | | of secular democracy and rationally founded and |
| an example of successful policy in some European | | | | sound public policy. However, the sophisticated |
| countries. While violence has nonetheless been a | | | | present, with all its modern bells and whistles, has |
| prominent feature of events in France, Germany | | | | not yet been fully successful at creating |
| and the Netherlands, violence alone says little | | | | electorally sensitive political parties, nor has it yet |
| about the underlying tensions causing it. What | | | | been entirely successful at completely eschewing |
| may perhaps help bridge the gap between cause | | | | religion from the subjective life of private |
| and effect is a discussion of the role of religion in | | | | individuals. This is true for both Europe and |
| the public affairs of the state. Reality in Europe | | | | Turkey. |
| dictates that "ambiguity and ambivalence | | | | Although not entirely part of the scope of this |
| embedded in the connection between religion and | | | | paper, racial and cultural discrimination and |
| secular European modernity," is actually indicative | | | | distinctions are arguably corollaries of a wider |
| of the "far from settled" interconnections | | | | accepted gamut of scientifically derived, and |
| between "religion, secularism and multiculturalism." | | | | culturally based, evaluations of what is and isn't |
| Fuat Keyman asks us to revisit Turkey's secular | | | | rational. In addition to this, public awareness and |
| past and be conscious of the challenge Islam "and | | | | public scrutiny of social and cultural constructs |
| its powerful symbolic and cultural role," has | | | | may not be sufficient to safeguard from the |
| constantly posed to Turkish Kemalist secularism. | | | | potential pathologies of the imperialist nature of |
| Keyman is a proponent of Turkish-EU integration. | | | | Western rationality. A further dimension is |
| However, this is not what matters. His analysis of | | | | required, one that asks the electorate in both |
| secularism leads him to observe that while | | | | Turkey and Europe to critically engage, debate |
| authoritarian secularism in Turkey was | | | | and discuss the possible effects of a Turkey-EU |
| successfully institutionalized so as to maintain an | | | | integration, or the lack thereof. |
| objective "social-structural process," this was only | | | | Conclusion |
| half the battle. An assumption that secularism is | | | | Turkey's democracy is moving towards becoming |
| an inherent corollary of modernity, and that | | | | more electorally responsive and, contrary to the |
| private individuals will proportionally adopt rational | | | | more ominous suspicions of some of its critics, |
| interpretations of their surroundings, the more | | | | not relapsing into a tyrannical display of Islamic |
| acute modernity becomes, failed. In fact, the | | | | authoritarianism. A wider recognition of human |
| opposite of this has happened. Islam in Turkey, | | | | rights as they apply both to minorities as well as |
| never having fully been discarded by private | | | | dominant cultural and religious groups, will naturally |
| citizens, acted as the paradigm in which | | | | follow as a result of this. However, the key |
| uncertainty was made more certain. Although | | | | catalyst providing the impetus for the |
| Turkish history is dominated by laicist repression | | | | aforementioned, as argued by Mousseau, is the |
| of religious manifestations, both in public and | | | | introduction of a liberal market economy and the |
| private life, it also speaks of the "inability to | | | | possibility for economic opportunities that, albeit |
| respond to the various Islamic identity claims to | | | | loaded with Islamic traditional values of community |
| recognition and cultural-group rights." | | | | and reciprocal trust, produce beneficial results and |
| The tension between Turkish state elites, | | | | allows for the further development and |
| committed to maintaining secularism, and political | | | | subsequent consolidation Turkey's democracy. |
| elites, more sensitive to the identity claims and | | | | Future relations between the West and East, the |
| cultural-group rights of their respective electorate, | | | | European Union and Turkey, will depend on both |
| has recently become more apparent. The | | | | European reevaluations of the role of religion and |
| European Union's hesitant response to Turkish-EU | | | | secularist constructs, as well as on future Turkish |
| accession negotiations however, has actually more | | | | advancements towards a more open society, |
| to do with Europe than Turkey. This irony is | | | | sensitive to unique regional cultural minorities and |
| made clear by Elizabeth Hurd when she argues | | | | majorities. However, if the EU persists on applying |
| that the latest strand of Turkish secularism, | | | | its conditions for membership through a top-down |
| neither traditional laicism (or Kemalism, a version | | | | approach, as if to say that only Western |
| of laicism), nor "Judeo-Christian" secularism, | | | | modernity and rationality is democratic, Turkey |
| "threatens not only the Kemalist establishment in | | | | will simply end up with having swapped the |
| Turkey but European secularists as well." | | | | Kemalist state elites, one hegemon, for another, |
| Furthermore, the implications of this phenomenon | | | | the EU technocrats. This dilemma forms a |
| are such that "Turkey's potential accession to the | | | | paradox that is missing from current debates on |
| EU has propelled the controversial question of | | | | Turkish-EU affairs; one that needs to be further |
| what it means to be both 'secular' and 'European' | | | | studied, discussed and appreciated. |