| On Sunday, August 20, 2006, Lebanon's Prime | | | | political realities, as the Shia and minority Alawites |
| Minister Fouad Siniora suggested that Israel, if it | | | | have long cooperated against the Sunnis in Syria |
| 'behaves wisely,' could be in a position to enter | | | | and Syria has aligned itself with Iran since 1980. |
| into a peace treaty with Lebanon. Don't schedule | | | | So long as Syria is positioned to exert significant |
| the celebrations just yet. Throughout the course | | | | influence in Lebanon and the Shia remain steadfast |
| of its long history, the Middle East has been a | | | | partners in helping perpetuate the Alawite Ba'athist |
| graveyard for optimism. There, the promise of | | | | government in Damascus--and Iran could |
| peace has typically proved more illusory than a | | | | accommodate Syria toward those ends--Syria |
| desert mirage. Therefore, the offer needs to be | | | | likely will not resist a de facto Caliphate. With Iraq |
| tested to determine if it is credible. Even if it is, | | | | being pulled in the direction of Iran despite the |
| major obstacles could still block the way to peace | | | | presence of more than 100,000 American soldiers |
| between Lebanon and Israel. | | | | there, the regional balance of power is beginning |
| Prime Minister Siniora's willingness to pursue peace | | | | to tilt more toward Iran and away from the |
| with Israel could be ascertained by determining | | | | United States and West. That trend will tend to |
| whether he is willing to engage in direct and | | | | further deepen Iranian-Syrian cooperation. |
| unconditional negotiations with Israel aimed at | | | | At a minimum, the Rejectionist group is likely to |
| reaching a bilateral peace treaty. Israel should test | | | | try to harden any tough negotiating positions that |
| the Prime Minister's commitment to peace by | | | | might be adopted by Lebanon. Following Egyptian |
| inviting him to Jerusalem for such talks. | | | | President Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, Syria |
| Afterward, rhetoric would have to give way to | | | | and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) |
| diplomacy. | | | | launched a diplomatic offensive in the Arab world |
| If the Lebanese Prime Minister is serious about | | | | aimed at blocking the possibility of a separate |
| peace, the path to peace between Israel and | | | | peace between Egypt and Israel. Later, at a |
| Lebanon is relatively uncomplicated in terms of | | | | sensitive moment in the early stages of the |
| the substance involved. An agreement would | | | | Egyptian-Israeli peace process, Morocco's King |
| declare that the historic conflict between Israel | | | | Hassan praised Sadat's "firmness" against what he |
| and Lebanon is "finally terminated," provide for full | | | | described as "Israeli pretentions." |
| diplomatic relations between the two countries, | | | | If that does not impede progress, terrorists could |
| resolve the status of the disputed Shebaa Farms | | | | instigate a major terrorist attack or series of |
| area in creating a secure, recognized, and agreed | | | | attacks to sabotage the peace process. In March |
| border, provide for the disarming of Hezbollah and | | | | 1978, the PLO seized a bus in Israel and killed 32 |
| offer assurances that both parties would take | | | | Israelis on the eve of Israeli Prime Minister |
| responsibility to prevent attacks against the other | | | | Menachem Begin's trip to the United States to |
| from being launched from their soil, and would end | | | | further the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. If such |
| any economic boycotts. | | | | attacks do little to abort the peace process, a |
| Nonetheless, uncomplicated as the path to peace | | | | campaign of assassinations and car bombings |
| might be, a host of obstacles would likely make | | | | directed at Lebanese leaders could be undertaken, |
| the peace process perilous. A glimpse at those | | | | much as occurred during the early 1980s. |
| possible barriers is useful in assessing the near- or | | | | Moreover, Lebanon's Shia could be encouraged by |
| medium-term prospect for a peace treaty | | | | Iran to seek a new governing relationship based |
| between Lebanon and Israel. | | | | on current demographic realities. Such a bid could |
| The Historic Arab Narrative: | | | | shatter Lebanon's delicate political structure and |
| The historic Arab narrative that sees Israel as an | | | | bring an end to any peace process that might be |
| "artificial" and "illegitimate" state could color | | | | underway. |
| attitudes against a bilateral peace agreement. The | | | | Radical Palestinian groups such as Hamas and |
| bias could be tilted severely toward a prolonged | | | | Islamic Jihad, both of whose leaders are hosted |
| ceasefire that falls far short of peace and full | | | | by Damascus, could seek to foment unrest |
| diplomatic relations. | | | | among Lebanon's Palestinian population. Lebanon's |
| In 1977, former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban | | | | political leaders remain opposed to granting |
| explained, "...history is the enemy of the | | | | Palestinians full rights of citizenship, even those |
| Arab-Israeli reconciliation. The past is the | | | | born in Lebanon. They fear that such an |
| adversary of the future. The vision that Arabs | | | | arrangement would upset the current sectarian |
| deduce form their history has never included the | | | | balance upon which Lebanon's political and |
| idea of a Jewish sovereignty in the heart of the | | | | economic system rests. Hence, even if Lebanon |
| Middle East..." Such attitudes can be overcome to | | | | embraces a long-term goal for the resettlement |
| the extent that a bilateral peace treaty becomes | | | | of Palestinians in a Palestinian state, radical |
| possible, as they were in Egypt and Jordan. | | | | Palestinian leaders could still provoke such unrest |
| However, in a weak state with a weak | | | | to help block a possible peace treaty. |
| government, not to mention a fairly large share | | | | Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia are likely to head |
| of the population that is radicalized, the effort | | | | up the Moderate camp. In no small part on |
| could prove much more daunting. | | | | account of those three states, the Arab League |
| Lebanon's Internal Dynamics: | | | | is already attempting to counter the money Iran |
| Lebanon rests on a fragile, often uneasy, balance | | | | is providing to Hezbollah for Lebanon's |
| between diverse religious groups. The religious | | | | reconstruction. "This is a war over the hearts and |
| balance continues to shift toward an increasing | | | | mind of the Lebanese, which Arabs should not |
| Muslim majority and a shrinking Christian minority. | | | | lose to the Iranians this time," a senior Arab |
| Muslims include Shia, Sunnis, and Druze. Christians | | | | League official explained. Concern over Iranian |
| include Maronites, Roman Catholics, and Greek | | | | hegemony could tend to erode the longstanding |
| Orthodox. As a result of its diverse population, | | | | Arab historical narrative, particularly as the |
| the Library of Congress' Country Study on | | | | Moderate effort is led by two countries that have |
| Lebanon explains, "sectarianism (or | | | | entered into peace treaties with Israel. |
| confessionalism) is the dominant social, economic, | | | | Negotiating Obstacles: |
| and political reality. Divisiveness has come to | | | | The biggest danger of a breakdown in |
| define that which is Lebanon... While Muslims and | | | | negotiations would come from an attempt by |
| Christians have lived together in Lebanon for over | | | | Lebanon to link a peace agreement to overall |
| a century, their deep disagreements over the | | | | Middle East peace. With Syrian and Palestinian |
| Lebanese political formula and state make it | | | | demands likely irreconcilable for the time being, |
| unrealistic to treat all Lebanese as members of | | | | such linkage could only preclude a bilateral peace |
| one social unit... Lebanon's somewhat peculiar | | | | agreement between Lebanon and Israel. Syria |
| political system has reinforced sectarian | | | | would seek to bring the Golan Heights into the |
| identification and consciousness." The report adds, | | | | calculus while radical Palestinian groups would seek |
| "Each sect has its own set of personal status | | | | a "right of return" of all Palestinian refugees and |
| laws... The confessional system of personal-status | | | | their descendants to Israel. Both would greatly |
| laws strengthens the role of communal religious | | | | complicate the diplomatic calculus and the latter |
| leaders and impedes the evolution of Lebanese | | | | demand would be a "deal breaker." |
| nationalist or universalist secular ideas." | | | | In addition to linkage, Lebanon could seek the |
| These dynamics translate into a weak | | | | fulfillment of prior conditions before proceeding |
| government that might not be able to gain | | | | with possible peace talks. Lebanon could seek that |
| sufficient public support to conclude a peace | | | | Israel turn over a portion of the disputed Shebaa |
| treaty with Israel. With the Shia population, | | | | Farms area to Lebanon as a gesture of good |
| radicalized by longstanding support from Syria and | | | | faith. It could seek that Israel turn over control of |
| Iran, now comprising up to 45% of Lebanon's | | | | that area to the United Nations in advance. Early in |
| population, popular sentiment in Lebanon is likely to | | | | the Egyptian-Israeli talks, Egypt demanded a |
| run against a peace treaty. The Christians alone | | | | guarantee that Israel would commit in advance to |
| could not conclude such an agreement without the | | | | turning over all of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. |
| risk of a fresh civil war. | | | | Later, Egypt requested that Israel demonstrate |
| At the same time, Lebanon's internal dynamics | | | | its commitment to peace by turning over the |
| also provide an ideal environment in which "state | | | | West Bank to Jordan and Gaza Strip to Egypt |
| within a state" entities can flourish. In the 1970s, | | | | before any agreement was reached. Afterward, |
| Palestinian terrorist groups enjoyed a large degree | | | | Egypt sought a transfer of the town of El Arish |
| of autonomy and used Lebanon as a staging | | | | as a "good faith" gesture. Historically, such |
| ground for cross-border terrorist attacks against | | | | gestures have gone unrewarded in the Middle |
| Israel. From the late 1980s to the present, | | | | East. Most recently, Israel's unilateral withdrawal |
| Hezbollah has dominated south Lebanon and | | | | from the Gaza Strip in 2005 did little to mitigate |
| launched terrorist attacks against Israel from | | | | terrorist attacks launched from there. |
| there. Fresh from what it perceives to have been | | | | In response to Sadat's demands, Begin replied, |
| a "victory" on account of the inconclusive | | | | "Nobody can get anything for nothing." At the |
| outcome from the recent combat between Israel | | | | time, Prime Minister Begin's seeming "intransigence" |
| and Hezbollah, Hezbollah is not likely to be very | | | | was widely criticized from within and outside |
| keen on efforts to bring about a bilateral | | | | Israel. However, well before Sadat had made his |
| Lebanon-Israel peace accord. Furthermore, even if | | | | dramatic trip to Israel, Israel had agreed to the |
| Hezbollah could be persuaded by Lebanon's | | | | principle of withdrawal, but the extent and |
| Government to accept such a peace treaty, | | | | implementation of such a withdrawal depended on |
| breakaway factions or newly-formed radical | | | | the agreement to a peace accord, rather than |
| groups would likely have the ability to supplant | | | | anything less than a full peace e.g., a ceasefire or |
| Hezbollah in the absence of broad-based | | | | truce extension. |
| communal support for bilateral peace. | | | | Ultimately, Egypt moderated its stance and |
| Regional Geopolitics: | | | | dropped its demand for prior conditions. That |
| Lebanon is likely to remain an important piece of a | | | | development led to the successful Camp David |
| growing geopolitical struggle between the Middle | | | | Summit in 1978. The Summit led to a |
| East's forces of "Rejectionism" and "Moderation." | | | | breakthrough agreement that paved the way to |
| Such a battle could put further strains on | | | | a bilateral peace agreement the following year. |
| Lebanon's weak government and divisive society. | | | | Outlook for Lebanon-Israel Peace Treaty: |
| Iran and Syria will continue to spearhead the | | | | Given the above background information, odds |
| Rejectionist element. Both have substantial | | | | appear to run strongly against the achievement of |
| influence with regard to Hezbollah. Syria still sees | | | | a bilateral Lebanon-Israel peace agreement in the |
| Lebanon as a historic part of "Greater Syria" and | | | | near-term. Given the hazards of a weak |
| is vying to keep Lebanon within its sphere of | | | | Lebanese government, fragile sectarian balance |
| influence. Syria could well attempt to use Lebanon | | | | coupled with Lebanon's changing demographics, |
| as a bargaining chip for pursuing its own demands | | | | regional geopolitical situation that is arguably tilting |
| with Israel and avoiding increased diplomatic | | | | more toward Iran, and possible procedural pitfalls, |
| isolation. A bilateral Lebanon-Israel peace | | | | the obstacles are probably too great to |
| agreement would shrink the pool of the Middle | | | | overcome, particularly within the next 3-5 years, |
| East's "confrontation states" and weaken Syrian | | | | if not longer. Neither Egypt nor Jordan faced such |
| regional influence. An erosion of Syrian influence | | | | an array of barriers. Egypt was a strong state, |
| could exacerbate internal pressures for reform | | | | was guided by a visionary risk-taking leader, and |
| within Syria. | | | | had the political capacity to break free of Arab |
| Iran sees Lebanon's Shia population as a natural | | | | Rejectionism. Jordan's King Hussein had enjoyed a |
| base for expanding its Islamic Revolution and | | | | long period of behind-the-scenes cooperation with |
| building a de facto Shia Caliphate that includes | | | | Israel and a strong relationship with the United |
| Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon, not | | | | States, and those factors coupled with Egypt's |
| to mention incorporating Shia populations spread | | | | previously breaking the taboo of recognizing |
| across other Middle Eastern states and beyond. | | | | Israel, greatly reduced the risks of his formalizing |
| Moreover, its role is not incompatible with Syria's | | | | peace with Israel. |